Assessing actual strategic behavior to construct a measure of strategic ability by Bilancini, E. et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 18 January 2019
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02750
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 January 2019 | Volume 9 | Article 2750
Edited by:
Monica Thiel,
University of International Business
and Economics, China
Reviewed by:
Davide Marchiori,
University of Southern Denmark,
Denmark
Marco Alberto Javarone,
Coventry University, United Kingdom
*Correspondence:
Ennio Bilancini
ennio.bilancini@gmail.com
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Organizational Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 31 August 2018
Accepted: 20 December 2018
Published: 18 January 2019
Citation:
Bilancini E, Boncinelli L and
Mattiassi A (2019) Assessing Actual
Strategic Behavior to Construct a
Measure of Strategic Ability.
Front. Psychol. 9:2750.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02750
Assessing Actual Strategic Behavior
to Construct a Measure of Strategic
Ability
Ennio Bilancini 1*, Leonardo Boncinelli 2 and Alan Mattiassi 3
1 IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Lucca, Italy, 2Dipartimento di Scienze per l’Economia e l’Impresa, Università degli
Studi di Firenze, Firenze, Italy, 3Dipartimento di Economia “Marco Biagi”, Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia,
Modena, Italy
Strategic interactions have been studied extensively in the area of judgment and
decision-making. However, so far no specific measure of a decision-maker’s ability to
be successful in strategic interactions has been proposed and tested. Our contribution
is the development of a measure of strategic ability that borrows from both game theory
and psychology. Such measure is aimed at providing an estimation of the likelihood
of success in many social activities that involve strategic interaction among multiple
decision-makers. To construct a reliable measure of strategic ability, that we propose
to call “Strategic Quotient” (SQ), we designed a test where each item is a game and
where, therefore, the individual obtained score depends on the distribution of choices
of other decision-makers taking the test. The test is designed to provide information
on the abilities related to two dimensions, mentalization and rationality, that we argue
are crucial to strategic success, with each dimension being characterized by two main
factors. Principal component analysis on preliminary data shows that indeed four factors
(two for rationality, two for mentalization) account for strategic success in most of the
strategically simpler games of the test. Moreover, two more strategically sophisticated
games are inserted in the test and are used to investigate if and to what extent the four
factors obtained by simpler games can predict strategic success in more sophisticated
strategic interactions. Overall, the collected empirical evidence points to the possibility of
building a SQ measure using only simple games designed to capture information about
the four identified factors.
Keywords: strategic thinking, rationality, mentalization, cognitive skills, game theory, depth of reasoning, strategic
success
1. INTRODUCTION
Human life in society is pervaded with strategic interactions, namely situations where at least two
decision-makers interact with each other to obtain prizes that are scarce, and that are assigned
depending on the result of the interaction itself: all decision-makers take an action among a set of
feasible actions in order to achieve the goal (winning or ranking better than others), and the results
of competition do not depend only on the action taken by a single player, but on the whole profile
of actions taken by all players. In human society, many activities are based on competition, such as
those involved in markets, sports, politics (even marriage can be seen as competition for a partner).
Bilancini et al. Strategic Quotient: Measuring Strategic Ability
Strategic behavior has been formally modeled by game
theory (Morgenstern and Von Neumann, 1944), typically
postulating perfect rationality of players (i.e., participants
to a strategic interaction), meaning that they always take
the best actions to obtain their goals, and that they have
consistent expectations on others’ behaviors (Mailath, 1998).
More recently, experimental economics has provided evidence
for large discrepancies between actual data and game-theoretic
predictions with rational players (Samuelson, 2005; DellaVigna,
2009). In particular, the assumption that individuals have an
abundance of cognitive resources has been questioned, and the
implications of its removal analyzed (Simon, 1955, 1972)1. Thus,
novel mathematical models of behavior have been developed
in order to account for experimental results, giving rise to
behavioral game theory (Camerer, 2003). Indeed, departure from
perfect rationality can be modeled by assuming that individuals
are prone to mistakes when making decisions: some mistakes
are systematic and depend on the heuristics followed as rules of
behavior (Kahneman, 2003), others are stochastic and result from
lack of control on the decision process (Young, 2001; see Javarone
and Atzeni, 2015 for a recent application). Another relevant issue
concerns whether rationality is aimed at pursuing individual
self-interest (individual rationality) or, rather, it is directed to
overcome potential conflicts of interest and to reach goals at the
group level (collective rationality, see Kirman, 2010, for a critical
discussion).
Within economics and game theory, the only attempt to
measure individual strategic skills has focused on strategic
sophistication as the ability of individuals to compute recursive
best response (see section 3.6). Conversely, psychologists have
long provided tools for measuring empirically many abilities
of individuals. One of the most influential and widely adopted
constructs is the Intelligent Quotient (IQ hereon), that was
developed to easily predict the general human functioning.
It is usually calculated on several subtests results (see for
example Wechsler, 2008), each one measuring specific cognitive
competences (such as short-termmemory) or a specific cognitive
domain (such as mathematical reasoning). However, IQ tests
are generally useful in predicting school and academic success
(not coincidentally, both IQ and school or graduation final
mark heavily depend on the average of other measures
of vastly different—and partly independent—skills) or for
identifying individuals who depart drastically from population
average, but lack in several areas (Stanovich, 2009), such
as capturing the difference between judgment and decision-
making2. The mere existence of such discrepancy undermines
our knowledge of human mental processes in a strategic context
and asks for a dedicated measure of cognitive skills in strategic
environments.
Our contribution is to borrow from both game theory and
psychology, in particular psychometrics, in order to propose a
1A shortcut often used by economists to model scarcity of cognitive resources is
to assume that individuals may use them but only at a cost (see Dewatripont and
Tirole, 2005; Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2018a,b,c for recent applications).
2The inability to follow a good evaluation with an equally good decision has been
called dysrationalia (Stanovich, 1993).
measure of cognitive skills that is useful to predict success in
competitive environments. We point out that, differently from
traditional psychometric tests in which individual attributes are
compared with normative data, here we cannot score a test in
isolation from others, since in a strategic environment what is
optimal for an individual must depend on the behaviors of other
players.
In section 2 we first present the theoretical background, and
we then introduce and discuss the proposed test. In section 3
we show our results, extracting factors by means of the principal
component analysis (PCA hereon), and providing synthetic
measures of strategic abilities, namely SQ8 and SQfactor; finally,
we test the predictive power of the identified factors and synthetic
measures, and we explore their relation with other economic,
educational and psychological variables, and with models of
strategic sophistication. In section 4 we briefly comment on our
findings, and we sketch directions for future developments.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Theoretical Framework
With the term rationality we refer to the cognitive abilities of
a player that subtend reasoning, monitoring, planning actions,
setting, and reaching goals, which are likely to help strategic
success (Gill and Prowse, 2016). Rationality roughly corresponds
to the so-called “executive functions” (Jurado and Rosselli,
2007; Diamond, 2013), which are known to be developmentally
stable (Miyake and Friedman, 2012) and are assessed in clinical
neuropsychological settings by using tasks that tap differently
in one function or another (Miyake et al., 2000). Individual
differences in executive functions are known to affect decision
making (Del Missier et al., 2010, 2012). One of the core executive
functions, inhibitory control, allows the individual to override
her or his impulse toward a lure in order to act in the most
appropriate goal-related way. Inhibitory control might play a
fundamental role in developing strategies that avoid taking the
route to the best possible outcome when this would ultimately
result in a suboptimal payoff given the structure of the interaction
(Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016b; Alós-Ferrer, 2018).
Example 1. Say for example that an interaction is structured
as follows: a player, termed “proposer,” chooses two out of three
possible outcomes (A, B, and C), then another player, termed
“responder,” chooses one out of the two that were chosen by the
proposer; both players get the outcome chosen by the responder.
Each player has personal preferences over A, B, and C: the
proposer prefers A to B and B to C (as such, s/he also prefers A to
C), while the responder prefers B to A and A to C (as such, s/he
also prefers B to C). The intuitive strategy for the proposer would
be to choose the preferred outcomes for her/himself, i.e., A and
B. However, by taking into account the preferences of the receiver
(s/he prefers B to A), the proposer would come to the conclusion
that the final payoff for that choice would be the suboptimal B
outcome. If s/he wants the best payoff for her/himself among the
three, the pair that s/he needs to propose is not A and B, but A
and C, since the responder prefers A to C.
In a strategic setting, it seems reasonable to propose a
distinction within rationality between optimization—i.e., the
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ability to identify the optimal course of action to achieve the
preferred goal in a fixed environment—and iteration—i.e., the
ability to take into consideration that the environment is not
given, but determined by other players’ choices, which are
presumably taken to achieve their own goals. In the previous
example, iteration was present at a very simple level, just
involving one step of—as it is called in game theory—backward
reasoning. However, iteration may be much more demanding, as
it is illustrated in Example 2 (which is also part of our test to
measure strategic skills).
Example 2. In this game, called p-Beauty Contest (Nagel,
1995), a number of players try to guess a number that is the
closest to a fraction p of the mean of others’ guesses. The player
that guesses the closest number wins the game (in case of a draw,
all drawing players win). Let’s say that the range from which a
player can guess is 0–90 and p = 2/3. Assuming that all other
players choose a number at random, a player should guess 30
as the number most close to the 2/3rds of the mean choice of
others (being 45 if choices are indeed random). However, if one
assumes the others to behave like the player above mentioned,
the new best guess would be 20 (as the closest number to the
2/3rds of 30). In turn, the others may behave like this latter player,
and so on. As it clearly appears, higher order iteration pushes
the (theoretically) optimal guess toward 1 (note that 1 is the best
guess when everybody else guesses 1).
Example 2 shows that iteration can be very long and
articulated in strategic settings. Not only, it also opens to a
following question: how long should actually be iteration to imply
success? The answer clearly depends onwho are the other players.
Indeed, the literature on beauty contests highlights that players
typically guess a number far away from 1 (Coricelli and Nagel,
2009). Hence, in addition to rationality, one’s own knowledge
about others is likely to play an important role in determining
success in strategic settings.
The knowledge about others is a complex domain that is
poorly understood (Krauss and Fussell, 1991). It is clear that
being able to correctly evaluate others’ behavior requires skills
that are not merely information-driven nor insight-driven, but
also requires a number of mental processes that encompass
specific evaluations and comparisons (Fe and Gill, 2018).
Knowledge about others is known to be based on one’s own
knowledge (Epley et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 2005, 2006) and
biased toward it (Nickerson et al., 1987; Dunning and Cohen,
1992; Nelson et al., 1998). Furthermore, others’ knowledge-
related factors are known to affect strategic decisions (see for
example Fabre et al., 2016, and Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2017,
on gender stereotypes). Following (Nickerson, 1999), “knowledge
about others” can be seen as the pool of beliefs, opinions,
assumptions and attitudes, and the states of mind that relate to
them. According to the theory of mind (see for example Premack
and Woodruff, 1978; Stone and Gerrans, 2006), attributing
mental states allows people to understand that the information
processed in others’ minds might be different from one’s own
mind, and to predict intentionality. In the following, we will
refer to the ability to form correct beliefs about others’ aims and
skills as mentalization. One of the most important aspects of the
knowledge of others is their cognitive skills. Example 2 shows
how a player able to compute iteration might make different
decision if predicting other players to be more or less able to
compute iteration (guessing 1 in the first case or a number away
from 1 in the second).
Cognitive skills represent an important aspect of the
knowledge of others, but is not the only one. Among many, we
focus on others’ preferences. Therefore, we propose a distinction
within mentalization between others’ preferences—i.e., the goals
that other players are trying to reach—and skills—i.e., the
cognitive abilities that other players employ for reaching their
goals. Example 3 illustrates the relevance of knowing others’
preferences.
Example 3. A seller aims at selling a good/service to a pool
of buyers, with no knowledge about their willingness to pay. In
order to maximize profits, the seller has to properly take into
account the reduction in the quantity sold due to an increase in
price. This is likely to be based, mainly, on rationality. Before
than that, however, the seller should correctly assess buyers’
willingness to pay, which is something related to other players’
preferences.
In sum, we propose that strategic thinkingmight be influenced
by the rationality of the individual, covering both the ability
to identify the optimal course of action to achieve a goal in
a given environment—called optimization—and the ability to
take into consideration that the environment is determined by
other players’ choices—termed iteration, and the mentalization
component, covering the abilities to mentally represent both
others’ preferences and others’ skills. While generally rationality
allows individuals to grasp the structure of the game and its
payoffs, mentalization allows players to predict other players’
behavior.
2.2. Measurement of Cognitive Abilities
Traditional methods for IQ estimation (e.g., Wechsler, 2008)
consist in a timed test which includes a range of problems to
solve. A score is assigned on the basis of the answers given by test
takers and the score is then converted into an IQ value according
to appropriate criteria and scale. Our ultimate aim is to provide
a measure of strategic abilities that uses the same method of
calculation as the IQ, but that differs in terms of the dimension
(i.e., construct) to be measured. In particular, we are not
interested to measure cognitive skills in general, rather we focus
on the particular abilities which are most relevant to the problem
of making the best decision in a strategic contest, namely in a
situation in which the outcome of one’s own decisions depends
critically not only on own choices but also on the choices of
others. In scientific studies on interactions between individuals,
the term “game” is used to indicate a stylized strategic situation—
a circumscribed streamlined model with precise rules—of
strategic situations which may be encountered in the real world.
Wars, Olympic competitions, courting practices, commercial
disputes, well drilling plans searching for hydrocarbon, and
negotiations for agreements regarding pollution reduction are
all strategic situations. Most of them are competitive in nature,
meaning that the success of one implies the failure of some other.
All these are formally representable as games, in a game-theoretic
sense.
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With this aim, we have elaborated a list of games—some of
which are commonly studied in the game-theoretic literature—
presumably involving the use of those skills that are crucial to
success in typical strategic settings. The procedure that we have
followed to administer the test to participants, and a summary
description of its content, is provided here in the following,
while more specific details can be found in the Appendix and
Supplementary Material.
2.2.1. General Data
Participants were asked to provide quite accurate general data,
with particular emphasis on education and socio-economic
condition. The time used to fill these data was in between 5 and
10 min.
2.2.2. Pre-test
Participants were administered (see p. 1 of the
Supplementary Material) a few preliminary questions
in order to assess their risk-preference, time-preference,
and social preferences as recipient in an ultimatum game.
Furthermore, they had to answer three questions concerning
pattern recognition in numerical and graphical sequences, and
propositional logic. The last question of this block was about
their willingness to pay for a reliable measure of their strategic
ability. No time constraint was imposed on this task, with an
average time of completion being around 5 min (and no one
using more than 10 min). We explicitly told participants that
these questions were not used to measure strategic skills, but the
aggregate pattern of their answers would have been objects to
following questions.
2.2.3. Instructions
Participants were given instructions (see p. 2 of the
Supplementary Material). They were invited to read them
with care and to ask questions in case of any doubt. Instructions
stressed that optimal choices depend on the choices of all
participants to the test. Three to 5 min were generally enough to
complete this phase.
2.2.4. Test
Participants were administered the test, comprising various
questions organized in ten games (p. 3 to 7 of the
Supplementary Material). Participants were told that they
should complete the test in about 30 min, but were flexible in
giving them five more minutes if required. In the following we
provide a concise description of all 10 games.
Game 1 asks about one’s own belief about the distribution
of answers to pre-test questions. Game 2 asks about one’s own
belief about the distribution of beliefs about answers to pre-test
questions. Game 3 asks to take choices in two different roles that
interact together: in one role (labeled Tizio) the optimal choice is
given, while in the other role (labeled Caio) the optimal choice
depends on Tizio’s choice, which in one case is given by the
distribution of behaviors when in the other role, while in another
case is taken by a perfectly task-maximizing automaton. Game 4
describes an interaction between two roles (labeled again as Tizio
and Caio) framed as weapon shooting: Tizio has to choose among
different weapons, and then Caio has to choose which part of
Tizio’s body to aim at when shooting; participants are informed
of probability of shooting successfully for each combination of
weapon and body part. This game asks first to make a decision
as Tizio, and then to make a decision as Caio, supposing in
one case that Tizio’s behavior is given by the distribution of
choices by other participants to the test, and in another case
by an automaton. Game 5 asks to choose the color and the
number, among given alternatives, that are predicted to bemostly
chosen by other participants to the test. While for the choice
of color no additional information is given, for the choice of
the number a implicit suggestion toward a specific number is
given (acting as a potential focal point, see Schelling, 1980). Game
6 (typically known as beauty contest, see Nagel, 1995) asks to
choose a number in between 1 and 90 that is the closest to 2/3 of
the average of others’ choices, where “others” are all participants
to the test in one case, only participants who provided correct
answers to all pre-test questions on pattern recognition and
propositional logic in another case, and a task-maximizing
automaton in a third case. Game 7 (typically known as ultimatum
game, see Güth et al., 1982) presents a dilemma where one role
(Tizio) has to choose how to split one hundred euros between
herself and another role (Caio), with the latter having then to
choose whether to accept the proposed split, making it effective,
or to reject it, with the consequence that both roles obtain zero
euros; participants have to take decisions in the role of Tizio
only, assuming that in one case Caio’s behavior is given by the
distribution of choices in the pre-test question when assessing
social preferences as recipient in an ultimatum game, while in
the other case it is given by the usual automaton. Game 8 asks
to give a selling price for a test which reliably measures strategic
skills; the objective here is to maximize revenues, assuming
that buying decisions are determined by the declarations
about willingness to pay for such a test provided in the
pre-test.
In Game 9 a scenario is presented where there are two
armies confronting each other, and whose commanders are the
usual Tizio and Caio; Tizio has to choose whether to burn
all his bridges, which would prevent any possibility of retreat;
after this choice is taken, and is observed by Caio as well
(this allows for implicit communication of intentions based on
forward induction, i.e., inferring intentions under the belief that
players always behave rationally even when acting unexpectedly
(see Govindan and Wilson, 2009), then Tizio and Caio have
to choose simultaneously whether to attack or retreat. Here
participants have to choose how to behave in the roles of Tizio
and Caio, considering actual behaviors by other participants to
the test; in one case, Caio’s choice is given by looking only at
those who provided correct answers to all pre-test questions
on pattern recognition and propositional logic. In Game 10
(which can be seen as a simple version of the centipede game,
see Rosenthal, 1981) a scenario is presented where two players,
again Tizio and Caio, have the possibility to make a decision at
different stages of the game in a sequential way (Tizio moves
first); each time a player is called to make a decision, he has
to choose whether to terminate the game and take a slightly
larger fraction of a given stake for himself, leaving the remaining
fraction to the other player, or to continue the game and give
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 January 2019 | Volume 9 | Article 2750
Bilancini et al. Strategic Quotient: Measuring Strategic Ability
the chance to make a decision to the other player, and by
doing so also increase the stake that will be shared. Similarly
to previous games, the distribution of choices by participants
to the test determine the relevant behavior of the other player
for calculating actual scores; in addition, Tizio plays in one
case against an automaton that that only cares about its own
stake.
2.2.5. Other Psychological Tests
Besides our test designed to measure strategic abilities, we
administered to the same sample of subjects (after the completion
of the main test) a number of other psychological tests:
the BIG5 personality traits (Digman, 1990) with the 46-item
inventory (it took approximately between 5 and 10 min to be
completed) aimed at assessing the constellation of traits defined
by the Five Factor Theory of Personality, the Raven’s Advanced
Progressive Matrices test with no age correction (APM, Raven
and Court, 1998; it took approximately between 25 and 35
min to be completed) aimed at providing a measure of IQ, the
Rational-Experiential Inventory with 40 items (REI40, Pacini
and Epstein, 1999; it took approximately between 5 and 10 min
to be completed) aimed at assessing the extent of rational and
experiential information processing styles, and the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) with 6 item (Primi et al.,
2016; it took approximately between 3 and 6min to be completed;
see Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016a, 2018 for interpretation of this in
terms of decision biases; see Stagnaro et al., 2018 for a test of CRT
reliability) aimed at assessing individuals’ ability to suppress an
intuitive and spontaneous wrong answer in favor of a reflective
and deliberate one.
2.3. Definition of Score Variables
Our use of score variables is theory-driven. We have used
answers to Games from 1 to 8 to calculate game score
variables and we have allocated them to four distinct groups,
one for each dimension of rationality and mentalization.
Scores for each part of Game 9 and Game 10 were kept
separated and used to test the explanatory power of the
factors extracted from the four mentioned groups of variables.
The reason for this distinction is that the first eight games
are relatively simpler, and each of them mainly requires the
activation of one specific dimension of strategic ability. The
last two games are instead more sophisticated and are likely to
involve all dimensions of strategic ability to a non-negligible
extent.
First, we have translated answers into numeric expressions
measuring how successful the answer is (more successful answers
receive higher points). Then, we have aggregated the scores of
each participant within each game, if they were supposed to
be driven by the same dimension of strategic ability, while we
kept them separated otherwise. Finally, we have assigned each
aggregated score to either rationality, distinguishing between
optimization and iteration, or to mentalization, distinguishing
between understanding of others’ preferences and understanding
of others’ skills. Here in the following we provide the motivation
behind our imputation procedure, while employed formulas
can be found in Appendix A. In our notation, if we aggregate
answers in a variable gnXy we mean that such answers come
from game n (with n being a number between 1 and 10), success
is mainly driven by dimension X (with X being either R, i.e.,
rationality, or M, i.e., mentalization), with y being its main
component involved (where y is either pref , i.e., understanding
of others’ preferences, skil, i.e., understanding of others’ skills,
opti, i.e., ability to optimize, or iter, i.e., ability to iterate
reasoning).
Scores for Game 1 and Game 2 concerning risk-preference,
time-preference, social preferences and willingness to pay have
been aggregated in g1Mpref and g2Mpref respectively, while
the scores concerning how well other participants performed in
pattern recognition and propositional logic have been aggregated
in g1Mskil and g2Mskil respectively. Scores for Game 3 have
been aggregated in g3Ropti, because even when optimal behavior
depends on others’ actual choices (when Caio has to match
Tizio’s choice, as resulting by the choices of other participants
to the experiment), the best choice by Tizio is self-evident
and hence knowledge of others’ cognitive skill is supposed to
play a negligible role. In Game 4, while scores as Caio are
aggregated into g4Ropti, the two scores as Tizio are aggregated
in g4Riter, since the actual (in one case) and optimal (in the other
case) behavior by Caio, which can be quite articulated, should
be appropriately taken into consideration, relying on iterated
reasoning to properly determine what is own optimal behavior.
The two scores for Game 5 both depend on coordination
success, but while the one about colors is likely to be based
only on the understanding of others’ preferences, and hence is
assigned to g5Mpref , the one about numbers has an evident
anchor that can be used as a coordination device and its
actual relevance is likely to depend on the understanding of
others’ skills, so that is assigned to g5Mskil. The success in
Game 6 mainly depends on the ability of responders to best
reply to others’ (either participants’ or automaton’s) optimal
behavior, hence relying on iterated reasoning, which is why
we aggregated all scores in g6Riter. A similar reasoning holds
for Game 7, leading us to aggregate all scores in g7Riter.
Finally, the success in Game 8 mainly relies on the ability
to understand how profits change as compound result of
decreased demand and increased price, therefore we coded it as
g8Ropti.
Finally, We calculated four distinct scores for Game 9—
labeled from g91 to g94—and three distinct scores for Game 10
– labeled from g101 to g103, with the purpose of checking to
what extent the information extracted from previous games can
help to predict strategic success. Basically, we each of these scores
codes whether the participant was successful in a single strategic
decision.
Table 1 lists the games together with the dimensions, and their
components, which should be mainly involved on the basis of
the theoretical framework, along with the game type and the
generated score variables.
2.4. Participants
One hundred and eighty-seven subjects participated in this
research (83 females). All of them were students of the University
of Modena and Reggio Emilia, with an average age of 22.63 years
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TABLE 1 | List of games with associated game types, main driver of strategic
success, and generated score variables, as resulting from our theoretical
framework.
Game no. Game type Main skill Score variable
Game 1 Guess others’
preferences
Mentalization–preferences g1Mpref
Guess others’
skills
Mentalization–skills g1Mskil
Game 2 Guess others’
guesses
Mentalization–preferences g2Mpref
Guess others’
guesses
Mentalization–skills g2Mskil
Game 3 Trivial backward
induction
Rationality–optimization g3Ropti
Game 4 Backward
induction
Rationality–optimization g4Ropti
Game 5 Pure coordination Mentalization–preferences g5Mpref
Pure coordination Mentalization–skills g5Mskil
Game 6 2/3 beauty
contest
rationality–iteration g6Riter
Game 7 ultimatum game rationality–iteration g7Riter
Game 8 maximize revenue rationality–optimization g8Ropti
Game 9 forward induction all g91, g92, g93, g94
Game 10 centipede game all g101, g102, g103
(standard deviation: 3.87, min 17, max 48). Most of them were
unmarried (174), have brothers or sisters (147) and have no sons
or daughters (183). About one third of the participants’ parents
completed collage (58 fathers and 52 mothers). Twenty-six of
them earned a perfect high-school score, while 30 out of the 75
(40%) who earned a Bachelor’s Degree obtained a 110 or 110
cum laude score. The monthly income of the household was
reported as being less than 1,000 euro for 9 of them, among
1,000 and 2,000 euro for 58 of them, among 2,000 and 2,500
euro for 69 of them, and more than 3,500 euro for 50 of them.
Only 10 of them live alone, and only 32 of them live in a house
owned by their family. Forty-five of them have had a stable
job during the 6 months before participating to this research.
Most of the participants were right-handed (161). All participants
received recognition for completing the tests and could access
the results of the tests taken, if requested. While traditionally in
experimental economics subjects are incentivized with monetary
rewards, we followed the psychological tradition of avoiding
external motivators. Participants were recruited via academic
e-mail communication and were briefed about the scopes and
modalities of the tests and participation. All participants signed
informed consent. Participants were completely voluntary and
could drop out at any time without any negative consequence.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. All data
were stored only using an anonymous ID for each participant.
The study reported in this manuscript has been conducted in
accordance with the practices for non-clinical research of the
ethic committee of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia,
and includes non-clinical tests using non-invasive, non-harmful
measures. No treatment, false feedback or deceiving method
TABLE 2 | Summary statistics of the game score variables for Game 1 to 10.
Game score variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
g1Mpref 187 0.36 0.07 0.12 0.51
g2Mpref 187 0.38 0.07 0 0.53
g5Mpref 187 0.72 0.33 0 1
g1Mskil 187 0.27 0.08 0.03 0.42
g2Mskil 187 0.28 0.06 0 0.41
g5Mskil 187 0.86 0.33 0 1
g3Ropti 187 0.96 0.18 0 1
g4Ropti 187 0.94 0.17 0 1
g8Ropti 187 0.60 0.26 0 1
g4Riter 187 0.69 0.34 0 1
g6Riter 187 0.52 0.19 0 0.99
g7Riter 187 0.54 0.25 0 1
g91 187 0.20 0.40 0 1
g92 187 0.52 0.50 0 1
g93 187 0.61 0.49 0 1
g94 187 0.31 0.46 0 1
g101 187 0.20 0.40 0 1
g102 187 0.37 0.48 0 1
g103 187 0.25 0.43 0 1
was used. Accordingly, we followed the ESOMAR guidelines3
stressing anonymity, privacy, and voluntariness of participants.
According to the local and national and guidelines this kind of
research does not require full review and approval by the ethic
committee.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Game Scores and Their Correlations
All game scores were computed endogenously, meaning that the
score obtained by each participant in each game was calculated
using the other participants’ play for the same game. This was
made clear to all participants at the beginning of the test, and
emphasized in the written instructions given as reference. Game
scores were aggregated in 12 score variables for the first eight
games, and in 7 variables for Game 9 and Game 10, following the
lines described in section 2.3. Table 2 reports summary statistics
for game score variables.
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations among all these score
variables which resulted statistically significant at least at the 5%
level. The small number of significant correlations across the four
groups of score variables for Game 1 to 8 suggests that such
groups actually capture different correlates of strategic decision-
making. Reasonable exceptions are g2Mpref and g2Mskil, which
are presumably correlated because they record scores of similar
tasks in Game 2, and g1Mskil with all variables for Riter,
which may be due to the fact that good knowledge of others’
skills correlates with basic cognitive skills which in turn are
a prerequisite for iterative rationality. This is confirmed by
correlation with Raven scores (0.24, p < 0.001). The significant
3https://www.esomar.org/publications-store/codes-guidelines.php
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correlation between g3Ropti and g4Riter is less straightforward.
One possibility is that, given the low difficulty to be successful in
Game 3, g3Ropti also captures complete failure to understand the
sequential game structure, which in turn is a prerequisite for a
high score in g4Riter (and not for g4Ropti).
In the group of variables for Mpref we find substantial
correlation between g1Mpref and g2Mpref. Moreover, g1Mpref is
significantly correlated with score variables for Game 9 and 10.
In the group of variables for Mskil we find strong correlation
between g1Mskil and g2Mskil. Moreover, both g1Mskil and
g2Mskil are both significantly correlated with a score variable for
Game 9. In the group of variables for Ropti we find significant
correlation between g3Ropti and g8Ropti. Further, g3Ropti is
significantly correlated with a score variable for Game 9, while
g4Ropti and g8Ropti are significantly correlated with a score
variable for Game 10. In the group of variables for Riter we
find significant correlation between g4Riter and both g6Riter
and g7Riter. Also, all score variables in this group correlate
significantly with score variables for Game 9 and g4Riter also
correlates with a score variable for Game 10.
Score variables for Game 5, i.e., g5Mpref and g5Mskil, and
g4Ropti do not correlate significantly with any other score
variable for Game 1 to 8. Moreover, while g4Ropti correlates
positively with a score variable for Game 10, both g5Mpref and
g5Mskil do correlate positively with a score variable for Game 9
but they also correlate negatively with a score variable for Game
10. Remarkably, these are the only negative correlations which
are statistically significant at the 5% level. If, on the one hand,
this suggests that the recorded score variables have a common
underlying determinants, on the other hand, this also suggests
that score variables for Game 5 may not capture well any of the
hypothesized components of mentalization and rationality.
Finally, the stark contrast between the rarity of significant
correlations among score variables for Game 1 to 8 and the
abundancy of significant correlations between score variables
for Game 1 to 8 and score variables for Game 9 and Game
10 is consistent with the idea underlying the design of our
test: playing successfully Game 9 and Game 10 involves several
dimensions of strategic ability which are individually involved to
play successfully Game 1 to 8. In this regard, we can also ask
to what extent Games 1 to 8 have been successfully designed
to capture distinct dimensions of strategic abilities. One way to
check this is to look at Cronbach’s α which is a measure of the
reliability of a test with many items attempting to measure one
single construct. If we designed the Games 1–8 well, then α is
bound to be very low. Indeed, it turns out that α = 0.36 when we
consider all score variables, which suggests that this would not be
a reliable test to measure a single latent variable.
3.2. Extraction of Factors Form Scores in
Game 1 to 8
For each group of variables described in section 2.3 we ran a
principal component analysis. We only took the orthogonally
rotated first component for each set of variables as the factor
associated with each group of variables. All factors have been
standardized. Table 4 reports the relevant information for the
TABLE 4 | The four factors extracted as first components from distinct set of
variables.
N. of individuals = 187 Mpref Mskil Ropti Riter
Eigenvalue 1.24445 1.53946 1.1771 1.50277
Variance explained 41.48% 51.32% 39.24% 50.09%
g1Mpref 0.6743
g2Mpref 0.7112
g5Mpref –0.1989
g1Mskil 0.7057
g2Mskil 0.6980
g5Mskil 0.1216
g3Ropti 0.7304
g4Ropti 0.2569
g8Ropti 0.6329
g4Riter 0.6223
g6Riter 0.6142
g7Riter 0.4853
Component loadings of 0.25 or higher were considered significant and are in bold.
factors extracted. We call Mpref the principal component of
g1Mpref, g2Mpref, and g5Mpref, we call Mskil the principal
component of g1Mskil, g2Mskil, and g5Mskil, we call Ropti the
principal component of g3Ropti, g4Ropti, and g8Ropti, and finally
we call Riter the principal component of g4Riter, g6Riter, and
g7Riter.
Each first component captures a large part of the overall
variance of the associated game score variables. Each component
is associated with a sizeable eigenvalue. However, while for
the rationality factors Ropti and Riter the factor loadings are
all positive and greater than 0.25, both Mpref and Mskil fail
to capture the variance of the two variables recording player’s
success in Game 5 (gM5pref and gM5skil, respectively). This
means that Mpref and Mskill do not convey much information
underlying the decisions made in Game 5. In the light of
the pairwise correlations discussed in section 3.1 this is not
necessarily undesirable, although it is a further indication that
score variables for Game 5 may not capture well any of the
hypothesized components of mentalization and rationality.
One perhaps surprising result is the very low correlation
between Ropti and Riter. Indeed, one may expect that the ability
to solve simple optimization problems in a given environment
is related to the more sophisticated iterative reasoning where the
actual environment has also to be determined. However, this does
not necessarily lead to large correlation coefficients if most people
are actually good in doing simple optimizations while few people
are good in doing iterative reasoning, as it is the case in our
sample (see Table 1).
Table 5 reports the pairwise correlations between the four
factors extracted. Since each factor comes from a distinct set
of variables there is no necessity for them to be orthogonal.
Nevertheless, correlations are small and hardly statistically
significant at 5% level, indicating that the four factors capture
distinct dimensions underlying the recorded measures of
strategic success. These correlations, together with the factor
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TABLE 5 | Pairwise correlations of the four extracted components.
Mpref Mskil Ropti Riter
Mpref 1.00
Mskil 0.15* 1.00
(0.04)
Ropti –0.10 0.05 1.00
(0.18) (0.49)
Riter 0.06 0.22** 0.05 1.00
(0.39) (0.01) (0.51)
The p-values are reported in parentheses.
loadings in Table 1, seem consistent with the theoretical
framework presented in section 2.1.
3.3. Theory-Driven Analysis vs. Data-Driven
Analysis
In our analysis we have identified the four factors by grouping
score variables in four different sets fromwhich we have extracted
the first component. This is a theory-driven approach. To
check its validity we also carried out two additional principal
component analyses which are more data-driven. In the first
analysis score variables are grouped in two sets, one group for
rationality and one for mentalization, and extract the first two
components for each. This analysis only presumes a relevant role
for the two main dimensions. The set of variables associated
with rationality is the union of the sets of variables used to
extract Ropti and Riter, while the set of variables associated with
mentalization is the union of the sets of variables used to extract
Mpref and Mskil. In the second principal component analysis
all score variables are grouped in a single set from which four
components are extracted. This analysis is fully data-driven.
Results are reported in Table 6 and are remarkable. The two
factors extracted from the group of score variables for rationality
are statistically indistinguishable fromRopti andRiter (significant
correlation of 0.99 and 0.96, respectively). In particular, factor
1 resembles Riter, accounts for 26% of the variance and has an
associated eigenvalue of 1.55, while factor 2 resembles Ropti,
accounts for 20% of the variance and has an associated eigenvalue
of 1.19. The two factors extracted from the group of score
variables for mentalization are statistically indistinguishable from
Mpref and Mskil (significant correlation of 0.95 and 0.97,
respectively). In particular, factor 1 resembles Mskil, accounts
for 26% of the variance and has an associated eigenvalue of
1.58, while factor 2 resembles Mpref, accounts for 21% of the
variance and has an associated eigenvalue of 1.19. In short, the
two components hypothesized for mentalization and rationality
also emerge, and basically coincide, with the factors extracted
with the theory-driven analysis presented in section 3.
The four factors extracted from the group made of all
score variables are extremely close to Mpref, Mskil, Ropti, Riter
(significant correlation of 0.76, 0.91, 0.45, and 0.97, respectively).
In particular, factor 1 resembles Mskil, accounts for 15% of
the overall variance and has an associated eigenvalue of 1.64,
factor 2 resembles Riter, accounts for 14% of the overall variance
and has an associated eigenvalue of 1.59, factor 3 resembles
Mpref, accounts for 12% of the variance and has an associated
eigenvalue of 1.36, while factor 4 resembles Ropti, accounts
for 11% of the variance and has an associated eigenvalue of
1.23. In short, of the four components that we extracted from
a fully data-driven analysis, two basically coincide with Mskil
and Riter, one component is extremely close to Mpref and one
component substantially correlates with Ropti. Overall, we find
that our theory-driven approach is well supported by data-driven
principal component analysis.
3.4. Synthetic Measures of the Strategic
Quotient
The findings presented so far suggest that, by adequately
measuring an individual’s abilities related to the cognitive
dimensions of mentalization and rationality, we can try to assess
the overall strategic ability of such individual. This in turn
suggests that we can attempt to construct a synthetic measure
of strategic ability, the Strategic Quotient (SQ), building on
reliable measures of mentalization and rationality. As a first
rough approximation we can sum up the scores obtained for
Game 1 to 8 in a single variable, denoted with SQ8. This variable
is likely to contain valuable information on both mentalization
and rationality since the scores for Game 1 to 8 have been
effectively used to extract the factors related to mentalization,
Mpref and Mskil, and those related with rationality, Ropti and
Riter. As a less rough measure of the SQ we can sum up these
four factors in a single variable, SQfactor. This variable should be
strongly correlated with SQ8 while taking away a substantial part
of confounding factors present in game score variables.
A first look at the distribution of SQ8 and SQfactor indicate
that there are no ceiling or floor effects and that both are single
peaked for a mid value (around 6 for SQ8 and around 0.02 for
SQfactor). The distributions of the two variables are depicted in
the upper charts of Figure 1. As expected, the correlation between
SQ8 and SQfactor is very high, 0.7754, and statistically significant
(p < 0.001). Hartigan’s dip test statistic provides support for
unimodality for both SQ8 and SQfactor variables (respectively:
0.0179, p> 0.97, and 0.0169, p> 0.99).
The next step is to check to what extent SQ8 and SQfactor can
account for the overall strategic success in Game 9 and Game 10.
To do this we aggregate the scores in Game 9 and Game 10 by
summing up g91, g92, g93, g94, g101, g102, and g103, obtaining
a single variable ranging from 0 (always unsuccessful) to 7
(always successful). The correlation between SQ measures and
the aggregate score variable is strong and statistically significant.
More precisely, the correlation with SQ8 is 0.20 with p-value
0.0045 while the correlation with SQfactor is 0.30 with p< 0.001.
So, both SQ measures positively correlate with overall strategic
success of a player, with SQfactor being sensibly more correlated.
To better understand the relation between SQ measures and
the degree of strategic success in Game 9 and Game 10, we
calculate means of SQ8 and SQfactor conditional on the aggregate
scores in these games. The lower charts of Figure 1 shows the
conditional means. Although all means of SQ8 are between 5.8
and 6.8, the mean of SQ8 conditional on a score of 6 (the
maximum observed) is more than 0.5 higher than the mean
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TABLE 6 | Comparison with more data-driven PCA.
First factor from Factor with highest correlation extracted from
4 groups of var 2 groups of var 1 group of var
Mentalization Mentalization Eigenvalue Variance Eigenvalue Variance
Preference Factor 2 1.30285 21% Factor 3 1.35593 12%
Mpref 0.9492 0.7550
p-value <0.001 <0.001
Skills Factor 1 1.58062 26% Factor 1 1.64267 15%
Mskil 0.9863 0.9145
p-value < 0.001 <0.001
Rationality Rationality Eigenvalue Variance Eigenvalue Variance
Optimization Factor 2 1.19356 20% Factor 4 1.23235 11%
Ropti 0.9865 0.4510
p-value <0.001 <0.001
Iteration Factor 1 1.55072 26% Factor 2 1.58839 14%
Riter 0.9610 0.9561
p-value <0.001 <0.001
The left column indicates the factor extracted from the set of variables described in section 2.3. The central column reports correlation coefficients with pairs of factors extracted from
two sets of variables (one for Mentalization, containing all variables used to extract Mpref and Mskil, one for Rationality containing all variables used to extract Ropti and Riter). Only
the highest correlation coefficient is reported, with the associated factor number (denoting the order of extraction). The right column reports correlation coefficients with four factors
extracted from a single set containing all variables (again, the factor number denotes the order of extraction).
FIGURE 1 | (Top) Distribution of the sum of scores in Game 1 to 8 (variable SQ8) and the sum of Mpref, Mskil, Ropti, and Riter (variable SQfactor). (Bottom) Means
of SQ measures (of variable SQ8 on the left and of variable SQfactor on the right) conditional on aggregate total scores in Game 9 and Game 10. Confidence intervals
are at 95% level.
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TABLE 7 | OLS regressions.
Scores in Game 9 and 10 predicted by SQ measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SQ8 0.3901** 0.4142**
(0.1213) (0.1245)
SQfactor 0.2159** 0.1909**
(0.0487) (0.0508)
Male 0.7481** 0.6143**
(0.2196) (0.2211)
Monthly income 0.0296 0.0535
(0.1378) (0.1355)
Age –0.0450 –0.0364
(0.0281) (0.0285)
Completed college –0.2441 –0.2294
(0.2356) (0.2369)
Father completed college –0.0844 –0.1050
(0.2885) (0.2888)
Mother completed college 0.2452 0.2128
(0.3309) (0.3222)
Observations 187 187 186 186
Individual controls No No Yes Yes
Dependent variable is the total score in Game 9 and Game 10. Statistical significance
is denoted by ** if p-value < 0.01 and *p-value < 0.05. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
of SQ8 conditional on a score of 5, which in turn is about
0.5 higher than the mean of SQ8 conditional on a score of
0 (the minimum observed). A similar pattern is obtained for
the conditional means of SQfactor. Such evidence suggests that
these rough measures of SQ mostly capture the top strategic
performances in both Game 9 and Game 10.
We further investigate the predictive power of our SQ
measures by running OLS regressions where the dependent
variable is the sum of scores in Game 9 and Game 10 and,
alternatively, SQ8 or SQfactor is the independent variables,
possibly with a number of controls. Table 7 reports the estimates.
In regressions (1) and (2) the only regressors are, respectively,
SQ8 or SQfactor, while in regressions (3) and (4) we also include
the following individual-level control variables: gender (1 =
Male, 0 = Female), net monthly income (1 = less than 1,000
euro, 2 = between 1,000 and 2,000 euro, 3 = between 2,000 and
3,500 euro, 4 = more than 3,500 euro), age, college completion
(1 = if obtained a college degree, 0 = if not), mother and father
college completion (1 = if obtained a college degree, 0 = if not).
Estimates indicate that one standard deviation increase in SQ8
(0.95) goes with an extra 0.38 of overall score in Game 9 and
10 (equal to 0.25 of its standard deviation) and, similarly, one
standard deviation increase in SQfactor (2.21) goes with an extra
0.44 of overall score (equal to 0.28 of its standard deviation).
3.5. Relation With Other Economic,
Educational, and Psychological Variables
A further inquiry of potential interest that our rich dataset allows
is the comparison between our SQ measures and economic,
educational, and psychological variables. More precisely, we
considered monthly income, college completion, attending
lyceum high school, our recorded Raven score, our 3-item IQ
measure in the pre-test, the 6-item CRT score, measures of
rational attitude and experiential attitude, as captured by the
REI40 (Pacini and Epstein, 1999), and measures of personality
traits, as measured with the 46 items BIG5 inventory (John et al.,
1991). Since this analysis is explorative p-values are adjusted for
multiple testing in the most conservative way (Bonferroni). As
a result we find that the only statistically significant correlate
of SQ8 is the CRT score (0.27, p < 0.0176), while the only
statistically significant correlates of SQfactor are CRT score (0.33,
p < 0.0003) and our our 3-item IQ measure in the pre-test (0.29,
p < 0.0053). This suggests that while our SQ measures and other
measures of cognitive abilities may reasonably overlap to some
extent, they do capture different things. Moreover, the significant
correlation with CRT is consistent with the idea that the ability
to overrule intuitive decisions with more reflective ones plays an
important role in strategic thinking.
Further, the fact that we found no statistically significant
correlation between either measure of SQ and the BIG five
personality traits suggests that SQ measures, which are aimed
at capturing characteristics related to the way individuals reason
and make decision, may not be much affected by characteristics
of personality. Importantly, this remains true even if we look at
the correlations of personality traits with the single factorsMpref,
Mskil, Ropti, and Riter.
We also investigate if the predictive power of our SQmeasures
for the success in Game 9 and 10 is reduced when we also
include the variables considered in this subsection as controls in
the OLS regressions presented in Table 7. Estimated coefficients
are reported in Table 8. Remarkably, both SQ8 and SQfactor
maintain a significant predictive power, while all the newly
included variables have non-significant coefficients. In particular,
one standard deviation increase in SQ8 goes with an extra 0.27
of overall score in Game 9 and 10 while one standard deviation
increase in SQfactor (2.21) goes with an extra 0.28 of overall score.
3.6. Relation With Models of Strategic
Sophistication
The literature on behavioral game theory has developed formal
models of strategic sophistication which have the common
feature of measuring the degree of sophistication in terms of
what is called the depth of reasoning. In the level-k model of
reasoning (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995) a level-k
type of player best responds by assuming that all other agents
are level-(k − 1) types. The parameter k is a measure of the
degree of strategic sophistication in that it counts the number of
iterations of best-reply reasoning to an initial belief (typically that
other players are all level-0 and play randomly). In the cognitive
hierarchy model (Camerer et al., 2004; Chong et al., 2006) level-k
reasoning is modeled with greater flexibility by letting a level-k
type best respond to a distribution of types from level-0 to level-
(k − 1). The endogenous depth of reasoning model (Alaoui and
Penta, 2016, 2018) assumes that the actual depth of reasoning of
a player, e.g., the number of iterations of best-reply reasoning
to an initial belief, is not exogenously given but the result of a
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TABLE 8 | OLS regressions.
Scores in Game 9 and 10 predicted by SQ measures
(1) (2)
SQ8 0.2891*
(0.1336)
SQfactor 0.1334*
(0.0571)
completed lyceaum 0.2647 0.2489
(0.4331) (0.4441)
rational_attitude 0.4124 0.3834
(0.2633) (0.2646)
experiential_attitude –0.2704 –0.2251
(0.2486) (0.2511)
CRT6 0.1057 0.1079
(0.0778) (0.0786)
Raven APM score –0.0459 –0.0434
(0.0265) (0.0287)
3-item IQ 0.0169 –0.0172
(0.1894) (0.1936)
Extroversion –0.1090 -0.1602
(0.1532) (0.1512)
Agreeableness 0.1728 0.2011
(0.2015) (0.1994)
Conscientiousness –0.2682 –0.2197
(0.1632) (0.1635)
Neuroticism –0.0110 –0.0132
(0.1795) (0.1767)
Openess 0.0708 0.0750
(0.2105) (0.2080)
Observations 186 186
Individual controls Yes Yes
Dependent variable is the total score in Game 9 and Game 10. Controls of regressions (3)
and (4) in Table 7 are also included but not reported. Statistical significance is denoted
by ** if p-value <0.01 and * p-value <0.05. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
decision-making process that depends on cognitive abilities and
payoffs.
Our dataset has not been designed for the purpose of allowing
a comparative evaluation of the predictive power of these models
[see Arjona et al., (unpublished); Alós-Ferrer et al., 2018 for
dedicated attempts] but it is rich enough to provide a simple and
clean proxy of the actual depth of reasoning of participants: the
number between 1 and 90 played against the automaton in Game
6 (i.e., the third task in Game 6, for which the only correct answer
is 1 and whose score contributes to 1/3 of the score variable
g6Riter). More precisely, a smaller number is a proxy for a greater
depth of reasoning. Note that, since in this strategic interaction
the opponent is an automaton whose strategy is known in
advance, if the participant correctly understands the instruction
then his actual decision is independent of initial subjective beliefs
and only depends on the ability to iterate best responses.
We constructed a variable measuring the depth of reasoning,
DoR, by taking the natural logarithm of the difference between
90 and the number played against the automaton in Game
6. Interestingly, and perhaps not too surprisingly, the variable
DoR is strongly and significantly (with Bonferroni correction for
testing over all factors extracted) correlated with Riter (0.40, p <
0.0001) andMskil (0.22, p< 0.03) but not significantly correlated
with Mpref and Ropti. As a consequence, DoR strongly and
significantly correlates with both SQ8 and SQfactor (respectively:
0.23, p < 0.004, and 0.32, p < 0.0001) and is a good predictor
of overall success in Games 9 and 10, with a correlation of 0.29
(p < 0.001). Differently from SQ8 and SQfactor, the distribution
of DoR has a single peak at its maximum value (the deepest
reasoning level). Moreover, while SQ8 and SQfactor seem to
discriminate well especially for extreme score values (as can be
seen in the bottom charts of Figure 1),DoR seems to discriminate
well especially for mid score values (the mean ofDoR conditional
on the overall score in Game 9 and 10 varies between 3.9 and 4.4
with a jump of about 0.3 passing from a score of 2 to a score of 3).
4. DISCUSSION
4.1. Conclusions
Success in competitive settings is, ceteris paribus, mainly driven
by strategic ability. A reliable measure of strategic ability, which
is currently missing, would be useful to predict success in
competitions. In this research we have moved the first step
toward the construction of a such a measure, the “Strategic
Quotient” (SQ). To this aim, we designed and administered a
test where each item is a game. The main novelty of our test lies
in the fact that the score obtained in each item depends on the
distribution of decisions made by other decision-makers taking
the test. From the collected data we have extracted information
on the abilities related to two dimensions that we argue are
fundamental to strategic success: mentalization and rationality.
For each of these dimensions we have identified two main
factors worth measuring: understanding of others’ preferences
and understanding of others’ cognitive skills (mentalization);
and capacity to optimize as well as capacity to iterate reasoning
(rationality). The evidence provided by the collected data
suggests that these four factors well account for strategic success
in most of the simpler games that we have designed to involve
mostly either a factor of mentalization or one of rationality;
moreover, the same data suggest that these factors relate to
strategic success in two more sophisticated games designed to
involve crucially both mentalization and rationality. Finally,
collected data show that aggregate synthetic measures built on
our test, summing up either game scores or extracted factors,
can provide information on the likelihood of strategic success
in the two more sophisticated games. Overall, this supports the
possibility of building a synthetic measure of strategic abilities
using only simple games designed to capture information about
a single factor underlying mentalization and rationality.
4.2. Limitations and Future Research
The research reported in this paper should be considered with
the following limitations in mind. Our sample is entirely of
university students enrolled at the University of Modena and
Reggio Emilia, and therefore it is in no way representative
of the overall population. In particular, given the endogenous
nature of game scores, this limits the interpretation of strategic
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success as success when playing against other students. So, our
claims regarding the measurement of strategic abilities should be
interpreted accordingly. However, in our opinion this limitation
is necessary in the current first steps of this research, because we
need to give to players an idea of who are the other players in
order to assess their ability to mentalize. More in general, any
approach which, like ours, tries to measure strategic success by
inferring it from actual strategic behavior necessarily leads to
a context-dependent measure of strategic ability because scores
depend on the group of players actually considered. In this
regard an important research step to be done is to identify a
number of broad and relevant contexts (i.e., type of participants
such as school students, college students, self-employed, workers,
elder, etc.) to get meaningful distributions across populations.
This would allow to have standard reliable distributions for the
purpose of measuring strategic abilities in relevant contexts.
Another limitation of this research is the small number
and low variety of games involving more than one dimension
of strategic ability. In our study only Game 9 and Game 10
are designed in such a way that strategic success reasonably
involves more than one component of either mentalization or
rationality. In particular, success in Game 9 (that may require
the player to use and assess the opponent’s use of forward
induction) reasonably involves mostly rationality, especially in
the form of iteration, and mentalization, especially in the form
of knowledge of others’ skill; instead, Game 10 (that may require
the player to use backward induction as well as to assess others’
preference for a fair divisions of prizes or for social efficiency)
reasonably involves mostly rationality, especially in the form of
iteration, and mentalization, especially in the form of knowledge
of others’ preferences. Besides these two games, many others
are both interesting and relevant for real strategic interactions
such as auctions, social dilemmas, war of attrition, bargaining,
voting games, and coalitional games. Many of these should be
considered in order to assess the validity of a general measure
of strategic ability.
Further, the collected data point to a few potentially important
modification of the proposed test. A first modification is the
elimination of Game 5, perhaps replaced by a game that captures
mentalization with less confounding factors. Indeed, Game 5
contains two pure coordination games: one about coordinating
on a color, where we supposed that knowledge of others’
preferences would have been crucial, and one about coordinating
on number with the provision of a focal point on the number
12, where we supposed that knowledge of others’ cognitive skills
would have been crucial. Collected data seem to suggest that
something else is crucial in such coordination games. Although
this might be interesting in itself, it also suggests to eliminate or
replace Game 5. Another game that should be modified is Game
3, because of an evident ceiling effect. Indeed, 92% of players
got the maximum payoff in this game, suggesting that it mostly
discriminates mistakes, misunderstandings and only very low
optimization (rationality) ability. Also, a modification of Game
8 might be considered. Although success in this game seems to
be well captured by Ropti, it also structurally involves knowledge
of others’ preferences (in particular, willingness to pay for taking
the test). In the current analysis we could control for this since
we also elicit such knowledge with Game 1 and Game 2, using it
to extractMpref. However, since this may not be feasible in some
situations (e.g., in a test designed to elicit different preferences)
it may be desirable to modify Game 8 in such a way that the
knowledge of others’ preference is less important for strategic
success. Finally, the last part of Game 10 seems to have not been
correctly understood by many players, suggesting that it should
be replaced or, at least, better explained. Despite the relative
simplicity of the iterative reasoning involved in this game (since
the opponent is an automaton which never makes mistakes),
only about 25% of the players were successful and many of those
who where not successful made hardly rationalizable decisions.
This could also explain why the score in this part of Game
10 was poorly predicted by our measures of mentalization and
rationality.
Finally, we are aware that the administered test is quite long
and effort-demanding for participants. This might have triggered
someone to switch by a deliberative mode of reasoning to a more
intuitive/heuristic one during the test, due to increased cognitive
load or ego depletion (Evans, 2008; Glöckner and Witteman,
2010; Kahneman and Egan, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
This is a source of confounding effects that we might want to
control for (for instance, by collecting response times; see, e.g.,
Alós-Ferrer et al., 2018)4.
Drawing conclusions, and in line with other contributions
looking at the relationship between rationality and success
(see, e.g., Javarone, 2015), our results indicate that rationality
is not enough to ensure success in competitive settings if
it is not coupled with mentalization. This observation may
open a research line investigating (by means of analytical
or computational techniques) the actual distribution of
skills between rationality and mentalization as the result of
evolutionary selection when the overall amount of skills is scarce.
In pursuing this research, an important role is likely to be played
by the degree of competitiveness, which might be seen as the
number of competitors for a given stake (see, e.g., Javarone and
Atzeni, 2015).
In future research we should also head for the development
of a more parsimonious version of the test that is both short
in terms of the time needed to administer it and easy in terms
of numeracy and literacy competences needed. This might also
help to keep experimental subjects in a deliberative mode of
reasoning throughout the test. In this regard, we think we should
aim for a test like the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005),
which can be easily integrated in many experiments and surveys,
allowing the construction of a vast database that can be used to
assess strategic abilities in many distinct contexts. For instance,
if further research confirms our finding that iterative reasoning
is strongly correlated with actual play in a beauty contest game
against an automaton that is known to always best reply, then
iterative reasoning could be measured by a single item which
score could be calculated without any need to consider other
participants’ play.
4Behavior has been shown experimentally to depend on the underlying mode of
reasoning: see Rand et al. (2012), for prisoner dilemmas and public good games,
Rand et al. (2016), for dictator games, Capraro (2017), for deception games,
Capraro and Cococcioni (2015), for allocation decisions, Bilancini et al. (2017),
for pure coordination games, Belloc et al., (unpublished), for stag-hunt games.
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